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Abstract
We consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren–Chriss market im-
pact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain
linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem
as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze
qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpreta-
tions.
Keywords: Optimal portfolio liquidation, optimal trade execution, illiquid markets, differential game
with state constraints
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a state-constrained differential game that arises for risk-averse agents aiming
to liquidate a given asset position by a given time T > 0. Agents face both price impact and volatility
risk. For each agent, there is hence a tradeoff between slow trading so as to reduce transaction
costs from price impact and fast liquidation in view of volatility risk. Beginning with Bertsimas &
Lo (1998) and Almgren & Chriss (2000), a large numbers of papers have studied the corresponding
single-agent optimization problems in various settings; see Lehalle (2013) and Gatheral & Schied
(2013) for recent overviews and more complete lists of references. The problem becomes even more
interesting when considering not just one, but n agents who are aware of each others initial positions,
a situation that is not unlikely to occur in reality; see Carlin et al. (2007) and Scho¨neborn & Schied
(2009). Together with Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2005), these two papers were among the first to
consider a game theoretic approach, but only study open-loop Nash equilibria for risk-neutral agents
using deterministic strategies. Moallemi et al. (2012) extend the analysis to a model with asymmetric
information. Carmona & Yang (2011) use numerical simulations to study a system of coupled HJB
equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two utility-maximizing agents. Lachapelle
et al. (2013) apply mean-field games to model the price formation process in the presence of high-
frequency traders. A two-player Nash equilibrium in a market impact model with exponentially
decaying transient price impact is analyzed in Schied & Zhang (2013).
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Here, we consider agents maximizing a mean-variance functional in a continuous-time Almgren
& Chriss (2000) framework, which is a common setup for portfolio liquidation. It leads to a linear-
quadratic differential game, which has the interesting additional feature of a terminal state constraint
arising from the liquidation constraint on the portfolio. This state constraint leads to two-point
boundary problems in place of the usual initial value problems connected with unconstrained differ-
ential games. Aside from the financial interpretation of our results, this paper thus also provides a
natural case study for a class state-constrained differential games.
Our main results establish existence and uniqueness for the corresponding Nash equilibria with
both finite and infinite time horizon. In several cases, we can also give closed-form solutions for
the equilibrium strategies. These formulas enable us to discuss some qualitative properties of the
Nash equilibrium. Some of these properties are surprising, as they show that certain monotonicity
properties that are discussed in the finance literature may break down under certain market conditions.
See Lebedeva et al. (2012) for discussions and for an empirical analysis of a large data set of portfolio
liquidations of large investors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we recall some background material on portfolio
liquidation in the Almgren–Chriss framework. Existence, uniqueness, and representation results for
Nash equilibria with finite time horizon are stated in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 contains a discussion
of the qualitative properties of the corresponding two-player Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria with
infinite time horizon are discussed in Section 3. All proofs can be found in Section 4.
2 Nash equilibrium with finite time horizon
2.1 Background
We consider a standard continuous-time Almgren & Chriss (2000) framework for investors who are
active over a fixed time period [0, T ]. An investor may hold an initial position of x shares and is
required to close this position by time T . The information flow available to an investor is modeled
by a filtration (Ft)t≥0 on a given probability space (Ω,F ,P). The trading strategy employed by the
investor is denoted by X = (X(t))t∈[0,T ]. It needs to satisfy the following conditions of admissibility:
• X satisfies the liquidation constraint X(T ) = 0;
• X is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0;
•X is absolutely continuous in the sense that there exists a progressively measurable process (X˙(t))t∈[0,T ]
such that for all ω ∈ Ω, ∫ T0 (X˙(t, ω))2 dt <∞ and
X(t, ω) = X(0, ω) +
∫ t
0
X˙(s, ω) ds, t ∈ [0, T ];
• there exists a constant c ≥ 0 such that |X(t, ω)| ≤ c for all t and ω.
The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for given x ∈ R will be
denoted by X (x, T ). Let us also introduce the subclass Xdet(x, T ) of all strategies in X (x, T ) that
are deterministic in the sense that they do not depend on ω. The ‘unaffected price process’ S0 will
describe the fluctuations of asset prices perceived by an investor who has no inside information on large
trades carried out by other market participants during the time interval [0, T ]. In the Almgren–Chriss
model, it is usually assumed that S0 follows a Bachelier model. Here we are sometimes also going to
allow for an extra drift to describe current price trends. Thus,
S0(t) = S0 + σW (t) +
∫ t
0
b(s) ds,
where S0 is a constant, W is a standard Brownian motion, σ ≥ 0, and b is deterministic and continuous.
2
When an investor is using a strategy X ∈ X (x, T ), the strategy X will influence the prices at
which assets are traded. In the linear Almgren–Chriss framework, the resulting price is assumed to be
SX(t) := S0(t) + γ(X(t)−X(0)) + λX˙(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
where the constants γ ≥ 0 and λ > 0 describe the permanent and temporary price impact components.
At each time t ∈ [0, T ], the infinitesimal amount of −X˙(t) dt shares are sold at price SX(t). The total
revenues generated by the strategy X ∈X (x, T ) are therefore given by
R(X) := −
∫ T
0
X˙(t)SX(t) dt.
The optimal trade execution problem consists in maximizing a cost-risk functional of the revenues
over all admissible strategies in X (x, T ). One possibility is the maximization of expected revenues,
maximize E[R(X) ], (2)
as considered in many papers on optimal execution and, with the notable exception of Carmona &
Yang (2011), all other papers dealing with corresponding Nash equilibria. Bertsimas & Lo (1998) were
among the first to propose the problem (2). In practice, it is common to account for the volatility risk
arising from late execution by maximizing a mean-variance criterion:
maximize E[R(X) ]− α
2
var (R(X)); (3)
here α is a nonnegative risk-aversion parameter. When dealing with the problem (3), admissible
strategies are usually restricted to the class Xdet(x, T ) of deterministic strategies; see Almgren &
Chriss (2000) and Almgren (2003). Except for the results in Lorenz & Almgren (2011), little is
known when general adapted strategies are used in (3); best of the authors’ knowledge, not even the
existence of maximizers has been established to date. The main reason for this is the lack of time
consistency of the variance functional, which does not fit well into a dynamic optimization context.
On the other hand, Schied et al. (2010) show that the maximization of (3) over deterministic strategies
X ∈Xdet(x, T ) is equivalent to the maximization of the expected utility of revenues,
maximize E[uα(R(X)) ], (4)
over all strategies in X (x, T ), when
uα(x) :=
{
1
α(1− e−αx) if α > 0,
x if α = 0,
(5)
is a CARA utility function with absolute risk aversion α ≥ 0. See Lehalle (2013) and Gatheral &
Schied (2013) for recent overviews on portfolio liquidation and related market microstructure issues.
2.2 Nash equilibrium
Now suppose that n investors are active in the market, using the respective strategies X1, . . . , Xn.
As in (1), each strategy Xi will impact the price process S
0, thus leading to the following price with
aggregated price impact:
SX1,...,Xn(t) := S0(t) + γ
n∑
j=1
(Xj(t)−Xj(0)) + λ
n∑
j=1
X˙j(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (6)
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Let us denote by X−i := {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn} the collection of the strategies of all competitors
of player i. Then, player i will obtain the following revenues,
R(Xi|X−i) = −
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt,
and seek to maximize one of the objective functionals (2), (3), or (4). A natural question is whether
there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all players maximizes their objective functionals given the
strategies of their competitors. For the maximization of the expected revenues and vanishing drift,
this problem is solved in Carlin et al. (2007) within the class of deterministic strategies. It was later
extended in Scho¨neborn & Schied (2009) to the case in which players have different time horizons
and in Moallemi et al. (2012) to a situation with asymmetric information. A system of coupled HJB
equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two utility-maximizing agents is studied
through numerical simulations by Carmona & Yang (2011). Here, we will conduct a mathematical
analysis of n-player open-loop Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization (3) and CARA utility
maximization (4).
Definition 2.1. Suppose that n ∈ N, x1, . . . , xn ∈ R are initial asset positions, and α1, . . . , αn are
nonnegative coefficients of risk aversion.
(a) A Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization consists of a collection X∗1 , . . . , X∗n of de-
terministic strategies such that, for each i and X∗−i = {X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗n}, the strategy
X∗i ∈Xdet(xi, T ) maximizes the mean-variance functional
E[R(X|X∗−i) ]−
αi
2
var (R(X|X∗−i))
over all X ∈Xdet(xi, T ).
(b) A Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization consists of a collection X∗1 , . . . , X∗n of admissible
strategies such that, for each i, the strategy X∗i ∈X (xi, T ) maximizes the expected utility
E[uαi(R(X|X∗−i)) ]
over all X ∈X (xi, T ).
Note that the equilibrium strategies X∗i for CARA utility maximization are allowed to be adapted,
whereas, for reasons explained above, only deterministic strategies are admitted in mean-variance op-
timization. We start by formulating a general existence and uniqueness result for the Nash equilibrium
for mean-variance optimization.
Theorem 2.2. For given n ∈ N, α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0, and x1, . . . , xn, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
X∗1 , . . . , X∗n for mean-variance optimization. It is given as the unique solution of the following second-
order system of differential equations
αiσ
2Xi(t)− 2λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t) (7)
with two-point boundary conditions
Xi(0) = xi and Xi(T ) = 0 (8)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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It will become clear from (23) and (24) below that, from a mathematical point of view, the
Nash equilibrium constructed above corresponds to an open-loop linear-quadratic differential game
with state constraints. The state constraints are provided by the liquidation constraints Xi(T ) = 0,
i = 1, . . . , n. They are responsible for the fact that we cannot apply standard results on the existence
and uniqueness of open-loop linear-quadratic differential games, and significantly complicate the proof
for the existence of Nash equilibria, especially in the case of an infinite time horizon as studied in
Section 3. It may also be of interest that the proof of the existence of solutions to (7), (8) rests on
the uniqueness of Nash equilibria, which will be established in Lemma 4.1 below.
Our next result states that the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is also a
Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization. It is an open question, however, whether there may
be more than one Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Corollary 2.3. For given n ∈ N, α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0, and x1, . . . , xn, the Nash equilibrium for mean-
variance optimization constructed in Theorem 2.2 is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maxi-
mization.
Let (F˜t)t≥0 be any sub-filtration of (Ft)t≥0. It will follow from the proof of Corollary 2.3 that the
Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization constructed in Theorem 2.2 is also a Nash equilibrium
for CARA utility maximization within the class of all strategies that are adapted to (F˜t)t≥0. In
particular, it is a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization within the class of deterministic
strategies.
Let us now have a closer look at the system (7). It simplifies when all agents have the same risk
aversion.
Corollary 2.4. In the setting of Theorem 2.2, suppose that α1 = · · · = αn = α ≥ 0. Then
Σ(t) :=
n∑
i=1
X∗i (t)
is the unique solution of the following one-dimensional two-point boundary value problem,
ασ2Σ(t)− (n− 1)γΣ˙(t)− (n+ 1)λΣ¨(t) = nb(t), Σ(0) =
n∑
i=1
xi, Σ(T ) = 0. (9)
Given Σ, each equilibrium strategy X∗i is equal to the unique solution of the following one-dimensional
two-point boundary value problem,
ασ2Xi(t) + γX˙i(t)− λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γΣ˙(t) + λΣ¨(t), Xi(0) = xi, Xi(T ) = 0. (10)
It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions of (9) and (10), but the corresponding expressions
are quite involved. The situation simplifies when the drift b vanishes identically.
Theorem 2.5. In the setting of Corollary 2.4, assume that, in addition, b = 0 and α > 0. For
θ̂ =
√
γ2 + 4ασ2λ
2λ
and ρ̂ =
√
(n− 1)2γ2 + 4(n+ 1)ασ2λ
2(n+ 1)λ
, (11)
we define
θ± =
γ
2λ
± θ̂ and ρ± = − (n− 1)γ
2(n+ 1)λ
± ρ̂. (12)
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Then, the ith equilibrium strategy X∗i is of the form
X∗i (t) = ci(θ+)e
θ+t + ci(θ−)eθ−t + c(ρ+)eρ+t + c(ρ−)eρ−t, (13)
where, for xn :=
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj,
ci(θ+) =
xn − xi
e2θ̂T − 1
, ci(θ−) =
−(xn − xi)
1− e−2θ̂T
, c(ρ+) =
−xn
e2ρ̂T − 1 , c(ρ−) =
xn
1− e−2ρ̂T . (14)
Moreover, the solution Σ(t) =
∑n
i=1X
∗
i (t) of the two-point boundary value problem (9) is given by
Σ(t) =
nxn
2 sinh(ρ̂T )
(
eρ̂T eρ−t − e−ρ̂T eρ+t
)
. (15)
The formulas in Theorem 2.5 can be further simplified in a two-player setting:
Corollary 2.6. In the setting of Theorem 2.5, assume in addition that n = 2. Then
X∗1 (t) =
1
2
(
Σ(t) + ∆(t)
)
and X∗2 (t) =
1
2
(
Σ(t)−∆(t)), (16)
where
Σ(t) = (x1 + x2)e
− γt
6λ
sinh
(
(T−t)
√
γ2+12αλσ2
6λ
)
sinh
(
T
√
γ2+12αλσ2
6λ
) , (17)
∆(t) = (x1 − x2)e
γt
2λ
sinh
(
(T−t)
√
γ2+4αλσ2
2λ
)
sinh
(
T
√
γ2+4αλσ2
2λ
) . (18)
The following mean-field limit is obtained in a straightforward manner by sending n to infinity in
Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.7. In the setting of Theorem 2.5, suppose that limn↑∞ 1n
∑n
j=1 xj = x ∈ R. Then, as
n ↑ ∞, the equilibrium strategy of agent i converges to
x− xi
e2θ̂T − 1
eθ+t − x− xi
1− e−2θ̂T
eθ−t +
x
1− e− γTλ
e−
γt
λ − x
e
γT
λ − 1
,
where θ+, θ−, and θ̂ are as in (12) and (11).
Note that the mean-field limit in the preceding corollary need not correspond to an infinite-player
equilibrium. For instance, if xi = 1 for all i, then the conditions of Corollary 2.7 are satisfied, but
the combined price impact of all players will be infinite so that the price process in the infinite-player
limit does not exist. A discussion of infinite-player equilibria for market impact games will be left for
future research.
2.3 Qualitative discussion of the two-player Nash equilibrium
Throughout this section, (X∗1 , X∗2 ) will denote the two-player Nash equilibrium constructed in Corol-
lary 2.6. It is interesting to compare the strategies X∗i with the optimal strategy of a single agent
without competitors, which, as observed by Almgren (2003), is given by
X∗0 (t) = x0
sinh(κ(T − t))
sinh(κT )
,
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where x0 is the initial asset position and κ =
√
ασ2/2λ. This formula can also be obtained by
taking n = 1 in (15). To study the behavior of the strategies X∗0 , X∗1 , X∗2 , we will need the following
elementary fact, whose proof is left to the reader.
For 0 < ν < 1 the function x 7−→ sinh(νx)
sinh(x)
is strictly decreasing on [0,∞). (19)
It follows immediately from this fact that X∗0 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of ασ2 if x0 > 0 and
0 < t < T . Economically, this means that the agent will liquidate the initial asset position faster
when the perceived volatility risk increases, because var (R(X∗0 )) is proportional to ασ2 according
to (23) and (24) below. So the first guess would be that the equilibrium strategy X∗1 should also be a
decreasing function of ασ2 when x1 > 0. This guess is analyzed and tested empirically by Lebedeva
et al. (2012) for a large data set of block executions by large insiders. In our equilibrium model,
however, all we get from applying (19) to (16) is the following partial result.
Proposition 2.8. If x1 ≥ x2 ≥ 0, then X∗1 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of ασ2 for 0 < t < T .
As a matter of fact, the monotonicity in ασ2 may break down in the two-player Nash equilibrium
if the conditions x1 ≥ x2 and x2 ≥ 0 in Proposition 2.8 are not both satisfied; see Figures 1 and 2.
An intuitive explanation for this failure of monotonicity is provided in Figure 3.
Next, X∗0 (t) is independent of γ, whereas both two-player equilibrium strategies are nontrivial
functions of γ. The intuitive reason for this dependence is the fact that the permanent price impact
created by the liquidation strategy of one agent is perceived as an additional price trend by the other
agent.
Moreover, X∗0 (t) is an increasing function of λ by (19). The monotonicity in λ has the clear
economic intuition that increasing the transaction costs from temporary price impact reduces the
benefits from an early liquidation and thus drives the optimal strategy toward the linear liquidation
strategy, which is optimal in the risk-neutral case α = 0. The monotonicity of liquidation strategies
as a function of λ is tested and analyzed empirically by Lebedeva et al. (2012). In our equilibrium
model, the monotonic dependence of X∗1 (t) on γ and λ can be obtained by applying (19) to (16), but
only if x1 = x2. We thus get the following result.
Proposition 2.9. If x1 = x2 ≥ 0 then X∗1 (t) = X∗2 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of γ and a
strictly increasing function of λ for 0 < t < T .
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the monotonic dependence on γ or λ may break down if the condition
x1 = x2 from Proposition 2.9 is not satisfied. The intuitive explanation for these effects is similar to the
one for the breakdown of monotonicity for ασ2. For instance, when λ increases in a Nash equilibrium
with 0 < x1  x2, both agents receive an incentive to reduce the curvature of their strategies, that
is, to sell slower in the first part of the trading interval and to sell faster during the second part.
Agent 2 will therefore create less price impact during the first part of [0, T ] and more price impact
in the second part. In equilibrium, this change in price impact generated by one trader also creates
a second, competing incentive for the other trader, namely to increase trading speed during the first
part of [0, T ] and to reduce it during the second part when the unfavorable price impact generated
by the competitor is increased. When the position of agent 1 is smaller than the one of agent 2, this
second incentive can dominate the first one quantitatively and hence trigger a decrease of X∗1 (1), as
observed in Figure 4 for λ < 0.05.
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Figure 1: X∗1 (1) as a function of ασ2 for x1 =
1.12, x2 = 2.06, T = 2, and λ = γ = 1.
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Figure 2: X∗1 (1) as a function of ασ2 for x1 =
0.7, x2 = −1.9, T = 2, λ = 0.2, and γ = 0.1.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium strategies X∗i (t) (solid) and trading rates X˙
∗
i (t) (dashed) for agents i = 1
(black) and i = 2 (grey) as functions of t ∈ [0, T ] for ασ2 = 0 (left), ασ2 = 0.8 (center), and ασ2 = 3
(right); the remaining parameters are as in Figure 1. When ασ2 is increased from 0 to 0.8, agent 2
receives a relatively high increase in volatility risk and therefore speeds up liquidation throughout the
first half of [0, T ], while slowing down in the second half. The volatility risk of agent 1 also increases,
but it does so less than for agent 2 and leads only to a small initial increase of the liquidation speed
−X˙∗1 (t). On the other hand, the increased price pressure from the temporary impact of agent 2 results
in unfavorable asset prices for agent 1 in the first half of [0, T ], and this latter effect can outweigh
the increased volatility risk to some extend. Therefore, it is beneficial for agent 1 to delay selling in
the central part of the time interval [0, T ] and to compensate by accelerating the strategy toward the
end. This effect leads to the increase of the intermediate asset position X∗1 (1) as observed in Figure 1.
When ασ2 increases even further, the increase in volatility risk becomes dominant, and so X∗1 (1) starts
to decrease again.
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Figure 4: X∗1 (1) as a function of λ for x1 = 0.2,
x2 = 4, T = 2, ασ
2 = 1, and γ = 0.3.
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Figure 5: X∗1 (1) as a function of γ for x1 = 0.86,
x2 = 0.28, T = 2, ασ
2 = 1, and λ = 1.
3 Nash equilibrium with infinite time horizon
Now, we consider mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization for an infinite time
horizon [0,∞). Financially, this problem corresponds to a situation in which none of the agents faces
a material time constraint. To simplify the discussion, we assume from the beginning that the drift
b(·) vanishes identically. Then, the unaffected price process is given by S0(t) = S0 + σW (t) for t ≥ 0.
Here, we need to assume that σ 6= 0. If only one agent is active, we are in the situation of Schied
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& Scho¨neborn (2009), where the problem of maximizing the expected utility of revenues is discussed
for an infinite time horizon. As discussed there, a strategy (X(t))t≥0 should satisfy the following
conditions of admissibility so that the utility-maximization problem is well-defined for a single agent:
• X is adapted to the filtration (Ft)t≥0;
• X is absolutely continuous in the sense that X(t) = X(0) + ∫ t0 X˙(s) ds for some progressively
measurable process (X˙(t))t≥0 for which∫ ∞
0
(X˙(t))2 dt <∞ P-a.s.; (20)
• X is bounded and satisfies
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
X(t)2 dt
]
<∞ and lim
t↑∞
(X(t))2t log log t = 0 P-a.s. (21)
The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for given x ∈ R will be
denoted by X (x,∞). As before, we denote by Xdet(x,∞) the subclass of all deterministic strategies
in X (x,∞). When the admissible strategy X is used, the affected price process is
SX(t) = S0(t) + γ(X(t)−X(0)) + λX˙(t).
It is shown in Schied & Scho¨neborn (2009, Section 3.1) that the total revenues of X ∈ X (x,∞) are
P-a.s. well-defined as the limit
R(X) := − lim
T↑∞
∫ T
0
X˙(t)SX(t) dt = xS0 − γ
2
x2 + σ
∫ ∞
0
X(t) dW (t)− λ
∫ ∞
0
(X˙(t))2 dt
(see also Lemma 4.5 below). Moreover, for α > 0 and uα as in (5), the unique strategy that maximizes
the expected utility E[uα(R(X)) ] over X ∈X (x,∞) is given by
X∗0 (t) = x exp
(
− t
√
ασ2
2λ
)
, t ≥ 0;
see Corollary 4.4 in Schied & Scho¨neborn (2009). As R(X) is a Gaussian random variable for X ∈
Xdet(x,∞), one sees that
E[uα(R(X)) ] =
1
α
(
1− e−αE[R(X) ]+α
2
2
var (R(X))
)
, X ∈Xdet(x,∞),
and so X∗0 also maximizes the mean-variance functional E[R(X) ]−α2 var (R(X)) over X ∈Xdet(x,∞).
When n investors apply admissible strategies X1, X2, . . . , Xn, the affected price S
X1,...,Xn(t) is
again given by (6), as in the case of a finite time horizon. It will follow from Lemma 4.5 below that
the admissibility of X1, X2, . . . , Xn guarantees that the following limit exists P-a.s.:
R(Xi|X−i) := − lim
T↑∞
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt.
The Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization can now be
defined by taking T =∞ in Definition 2.1. Here is our result on the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibria.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) n ∈ N is arbitrary and α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0;
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(b) n = 2 and α1 and α2 are distinct and strictly positive.
Then, for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (X∗1 , . . . , X∗n) for mean-variance
optimization with infinite time horizon. Moreover, (X∗1 , . . . , X∗n) is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA
utility maximization with infinite time horizon.
In case (a), the optimal strategies are given by
X∗i (t) = (xi − xn)eθ−t + xneρ−t, (22)
where again xn =
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj and ρ− and θ− are as in (12).
In case (b), the fourth-order equation
τ4 − 2γ
3λ
τ3 − γ
2 + 2λσ2(α1 + α2)
3λ2
τ2 +
σ4α1α2
3λ2
= 0
has precisely two distinct roots, τ1, τ2, in (−∞, 0), and the equilibrium strategies X∗1 (t) and X∗2 (t) are
linear combinations of the exponential functions eτ1t and eτ2t.
On the one hand, the structure of the equilibrium strategies for an infinite time horizon appears
to be simpler than for the finite-time situation. On the other hand, the assumptions of Theorem 3.1
are more restrictive than those of Theorem 2.2. More restrictive assumptions are needed, because
all solutions X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) of the system (7) are linear combinations of exponential functions and
thus can only take the limits ±∞ and 0 for t ↑ ∞. We must single out those with limit 0. To this
end, we cannot apply standard results on the existence of solutions for boundary value problems on
noncompact intervals such as those in Cecchi et al. (1980), where it is required that the possible
boundary values at t = ∞ include the full space Rn. Instead, we show here that the eigenspaces
associated with the negative eigenvalues of a certain nonsymmetric matrix M are sufficiently rich. For
n > 2, we are only able to understand these eigenspaces when α1 = · · · = αn.
Remark 3.2. In the situation of part (a) of Theorem 3.1, consider the corresponding Nash equilibrium
X
(T )
1 , . . . , X
(T )
n for the finite time interval [0, T ] as constructed in Theorem 2.5. Then, we conclude
from (13) and (14) that
lim
T↑∞
X
(T )
i (t) = X
∗
i (t), for i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0,
where X∗i is as in (22).
Let us finally discuss some qualitative properties of the Nash equilibrium in part (a) of Theorem 3.1.
Carlin et al. (2007) and Scho¨neborn & Schied (2009) study, among other things, whether the liquidation
of a large block of shares by agent 1 leads either to predatory trading or liquidity provision by the
other agents if these all have zero initial capital (i.e., xi = 0 for i 6= 1). Here, predatory trading
refers to a strategy during which the asset is shortened at the initial high price and then bought back
later when the sell strategy of agent 1 has depreciated the asset price. This strategy is “predatory”
in the sense that the revenues it generates for agent i are made at the expense of agent 1. Liquidity
provision refers to exactly the opposite strategy: agent i acquires a long position by first buying and
later re-selling some of the shares agent 1 is liquidating. It can hence be seen as a cooperative behavior
on behalf of agent i. Both Carlin et al. (2007) and Scho¨neborn & Schied (2009) consider risk-neutral
agents who need to close their positions in finite time. In Carlin et al. (2007), all agents face the same
time constraint. In this case, liquidity provision can only be observed if cooperation is enforced by
repeating the game. Scho¨neborn & Schied (2009) admit a longer time horizon for agents i = 2, . . . , n
than for agent 1 and find that this relaxation can lead to liquidity provision for certain parameter
values without having to repeat the game. Our corresponding result is Corollary 3.3 below. It states
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that, on an infinite time horizon, both predatory trading and liquidity provision can occur, depending
on the parameters of the model; see also Figure 6 for an illustration. Together with Remark 3.2,
Corollary 3.3 implies that liquidity provision can also occur if all agents share the same time horizon
T , provided that T is sufficiently large. This fact that is markedly different from the risk-neutral case
α = 0 considered in Carlin et al. (2007).
Corollary 3.3. In the situation of part (a) of Theorem 3.1, suppose that
∑n
i=1 xi > 0. Then an agent
with xi = 0 engages in liquidity provision in the sense that X
∗
i (t) > 0 for all t > 0, if and only if
ασ2λ > 2γ2. When ασ2λ < 2γ2 this agent engages in predatory trading, and for ασ2λ = 2γ2 the
agent does not trade at all.
Finally, we briefly discuss the behavior of equilibrium strategies as a function of the number n of
agents active in the market. Lebedeva et al. (2012) discuss the following two hypotheses and analyze
their validity for a large data set of block executions by large insiders:
Hypothesis 1: “Trade duration decreases if several insiders compete for exploiting the same long-
lived information.”
Hypothesis 2: “Trade duration increases if several insiders trade simultaneously in the same direction
for liquidity reasons.”
In the situation of part (a) of our Theorem 3.1, the effective trade duration can be both increasing or
decreasing in n, or even lack monotonicity entirely; see Figure 7. Here, the effective trade duration is
defined as the time until a certain high percentage of the initial inventory has been liquidated. So both
hypotheses from Lebedeva et al. (2012) are compatible with risk-averse agents in an Almgren–Chriss
setting.
n=2
n=10
n=20
n=30
n=40
2 4 6 8
-0.0015
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n=20
n=30
n=40
2 4 6 8
0.0002
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0.0008
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0.0012
0.0014
Figure 6: Strategies X∗i (t) for λ = 0.15 (left) and λ = 0.16 (right) for various choices of n and for
xi = 0,
∑n
j=1 xj = 1, γ = 0.16, and ασ
2 = 0.33.
4 Proofs
4.1 Proofs for a finite time horizon
Let admissible strategies Xi ∈ X (xi, T ) be given and write X−i := {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn} for
i = 1, . . . , n. For Y ∈X (y, T ), we note first that, after integrating by parts,
R(Y |X−i) = yS0 − γ
2
y2 +
∫ T
0
Y (t)
(
b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t)
)
dt
− λ
n∑
j 6=i
∫ T
0
Y˙ (t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
∫ T
0
Y˙ (t)2 dt+ σ
∫ T
0
Y (t) dW (t).
11
Figure 7: Effective liquidation time of X∗1 , defined as the time until 99% of the initial inventory x1
have been liquidated, plotted as a function of n ∈ {1, . . . , 40}. In the left-hand panel, we we see that
monotonicity in n can be reversed by a very small change in γ; we took γ = 0.155 (circles) and γ = 0.16
(bullets) with x1 = 1,
∑n
i=1 xi = 3.5, λ = 0.15, and ασ
2 = 0.33. In the right-hand panel, we observe
that the effective liquidation time need not be monotone in n; here we chose x1 = 5,
∑n
i=1 xi = 10,
λ = 2, γ = 0.1, and ασ2 = 0.33.
When all Xi and Y are deterministic, it follows that
E[R(Y |X−i) ]− αi
2
var (R(Y |X−i)) = c+
∫ T
0
L i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt, (23)
where c = yS0 − γ2y2 and the Lagrangian L i is given by
L i(t, q, p|X−i) = q
(
b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t)
)
− αiσ
2
2
q2 − λp
(∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + p
)
. (24)
Lemma 4.1. In the context of Theorem 2.2, there exists at most one Nash equilibrium for mean-
variance optimization.
Proof. We assume by way of contradiction that X01 , . . . , X
0
n and X
1
0 , . . . , X
1
n are two distinct Nash
equilibria with Xki ∈X (xi, T ) for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 0, 1. For β ∈ [0, 1], let Xβi := βX1i + (1−β)X0i
and define
f(β) :=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
L i(t,Xβi (t), X˙
β
i (t)|X0−i) +L i(t,X1−βi (t), X˙1−βi (t)|X1−i)
)
dt.
By assumption, the strategy Xki maximizes the functional Y 7→
∫ T
0 L
i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|Xk−i) dt within
the class Xdet(xi, T ) for k = 0, 1. We therefore must have f(β) ≤ f(0) for β > 0, which implies that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0+
f(β) ≤ 0. (25)
On the other hand, by interchanging differentiation and integration, which is permitted due to our
assumptions on admissible strategies and due to the linear-quadratic form of the Lagrangian, a short
computation shows that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0+
f(β)
=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[
γ(X1i (t)−X0i (t))
n∑
j=1
(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t))− γ(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))
+ αiσ
2(X1i (t)−X0i (t))2 + λ(X˙1i (t)− X˙0i (t))
n∑
j=1
(X˙1j (t)− X˙0j (t)) + λ(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))2
]
dt.
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We note next that∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t)) dt =
1
2
(X1i (T )−X0i (T ))2 −
1
2
(X1i (0)−X0i (0))2 = 0.
Moreover, by the same argument,∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t)) dt = −
∫ T
0
(X1j (t)−X0j (t))(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t)) dt,
and hence
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))(X˙0j (t)− X˙1j (t)) dt = 0.
It follows that
d
dβ
∣∣∣
β=0+
f(β) =
∫ T
0
[
αiσ
2
n∑
i=1
(X1i (t)−X0i (t))2 + λ
n∑
i=1
(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))2 + λ
( n∑
i=1
(X˙0i (t)− X˙1i (t))
)2]
dt,
which is strictly positive because the two Nash equilibria X01 , . . . , X
0
n and X
1
0 , . . . , X
1
n are distinct. But
strict positivity contradicts (25).
Lemma 4.2. For i = 1, . . . , n there exists at most one maximizer in Xdet(y, T ) of the functional
Y 7→ ∫ T0 L i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt. If, moreover, X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C2[0, T ], then there exists a unique
maximizer Y ∗ ∈Xdet(y, T )∩C2[0, T ], which is given as the unique solution of the two-point boundary
value problem {
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = b(t) + γ∑j 6=i X˙j(t) + λ∑j 6=i X¨j(t),
Y (0) = y, Y (T ) = 0.
Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the LagrangianL i and the convexity of the setXdet(y, T )
that there can be at most one maximizer in Xdet(y, T ).
Now, we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumption X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C2[0, T ].
Under this assumption, we may formulate the Euler–Lagrange equation L iq (t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) =
d
dtL
i
p(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i), which for our specific Lagrangian becomes:
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t). (26)
Denoting the right-hand side of (26) by u(t), the general solution of this second-order ODE is of the
form
Y (t) = c1e
−κit + c2eκit − 1
4λκi
∫ t
0
eκi(t−s)u(s) ds+
1
4λκi
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds,
where c1 and c2 are constants and κi =
√
αiσ2/2λ. It is clear that the two constants c1 and c2 can be
uniquely determined by imposing the boundary conditions Y (0) = y and Y (T ) = 0. From now on, let
Y ∗ ∈Xdet(y, T ) ∩C2[0, T ] denote the corresponding solution. We will now verify that Y ∗ is indeed a
maximizer of our problem. To this end, let Y ∈ Xdet(y, T ) be arbitrary. Using first the concavity of
(q, p) 7→ L i(t, q, p|X−i) and then the fact that Y ∗ solves the Euler–Lagrange equation, we get
L i(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))−L i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i)
≥ L iq (t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y ∗(t)− Y (t)) +L ip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y˙ ∗(t)− Y˙ (t))
=
( d
dt
L ip(t, Y
∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)
)
(Y ∗(t)− Y (t)) +L ip(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i))(Y˙ ∗(t)− Y˙ (t))
=
d
dt
(
L ip(t, Y
∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)(Y ∗(t)− Y (t))
)
.
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Therefore, ∫ T
0
L i(t, Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i) dt−
∫ T
0
L i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt
≥
∫ T
0
d
dt
(
L ip(t, Y
∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t)|X−i)(Y ∗(t)− Y (t))
)
dt = 0,
where in the final step we have used that Y ∗(0) = Y (0) and Y ∗(T ) = Y (T ). This proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. According to Lemma 4.1, there exists at most one Nash equilibrium. We will
now show that there exists a Nash equilibrium X∗1 , . . . , X∗n such that each strategy X∗i belongs to
Xdet(xi, T ) ∩ C2[0, T ]. By Lemma 4.2, each strategy X∗i must then be a solution of the second-order
differential equation
αiσ
2Xi(t)− 2λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙∗j (t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨∗j (t), (27)
with boundary conditions
Xi(0) = xi and Xi(T ) = 0. (28)
We can clearly combine the n differential equations (27) into a system of n coupled second-order linear
ordinary differential equations for the vector X∗ := (X∗1 , . . . , X∗n)>. It follows again from Lemma 4.2
that every C2-solution of the system (27), (28) is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore the assertion of
the theorem will follow if we can show the existence of a C2-solution to the n-dimensional two-point
boundary value problem (27), (28).
By introducing the auxiliary function Y (t) for the derivative X˙(t), by letting b(t) be the vector
with all components equal to b(t), and by defining the n × n matrices A := σ2diag(α1, . . . , αn), the
identity matrix I = diag(1, . . . , 1), and the matrix J with all entries equal to one, the system (27) can
be re-written as follows:(
A −γ(J − I)
0 I
)(
X(t)
Y (t)
)
−
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)(
X˙(t)
Y˙ (t)
)
=
(
b(t)
0
)
. (29)
Clearly, X is a C2-solution of (27) if and only if
(X
X˙
)
is a C1-solution of (29). In particular, every
C1-solution of (29) with boundary conditions (28) yields a Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the homogeneous system (29), (28) with b(t) = 0 and initial values x1 = · · · = xn = 0.
The corresponding boundary condition can be written as
(X(0),Y (0),X(T ),Y (T ))> ∈ V, (30)
where V ⊂ R4n is the 2n-dimensional linear space
V =
{
(x0,y0,x1,y1)
> ∈ R4n |x0 = x1 = 0
}
.
It is clear that
(
X
Y
)
=
(
0
0
)
is a solution. In fact, this trivial solution is the only solution as every
solution must be a Nash equilibrium, and Nash equilibria are unique by Lemma 4.1. It therefore
follows from the general theory of linear boundary value problems for systems of ordinary differential
equations that the two-point boundary value problem (29), (30) has a unique C1-solution for every
continuous b : [0, T ]→ Rn (and in fact for every continuous R2n-valued function substituting (b(t)0 ) on
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the right-hand side of (29)); see Kurzweil (1986, (9.22), p. 189). Using this fact, we let
(
X0
Y 0
)
be the
solution of (29), (30) when b(t) in (29) is replaced by b0(t) = (b01(t), . . . , b
0
n(t)) for
b0i (t) = b(t) +
T − t
T
αiσ
2xi +
γ
T
∑
j 6=i
xj .
One then checks that
X∗i (t) := X
0
i (t) +
T − t
T
xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
solves (27), (28) and is thus the desired Nash equilibrium.
Remark 4.3. For A := σ2diag(α1, . . . , αn), the identity matrix I, and the matrix J with all entries
equal to one, let
M :=
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1(
A −γ(J − I)
0 I
)
.
and
f(t) := −
(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1(
b(t)
0
)
.
With this notation and Z(t) := (X(t),Y (t))>, the system (29) can now be written as
Z˙(t) = MZ(t) + f(t). (31)
Note that J2 = nJ and that hence (J + I)(I − 1n+1J) = I = (I − 1n+1J)(J + I). It follows that(
0 λ(J + I)
I 0
)−1
=
(
0 I
1
λ(I − 1n+1J) 0
)
,
and hence that
M =
(
0 I
1
λ(A− 1n+1JA) γλ(I − 2n+1J)
)
. (32)
Proof of Corollary 2.3. Let X∗1 , . . . , X∗n be the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimiza-
tion as constructed in Theorem 2.2. When X∗−i = {X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗n} is fixed, the ith agent
perceives
SX
∗
−i(t) := S0(t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
(Xj(t)−Xj(0)) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
as “unaffected” price process. It is of the form
SX
∗
−i(t) = S0 + σW (t) +
∫ t
0
bi(s) ds
for a deterministic and continuous function bi : [0, T ] → R. As the process SX∗−i has independent
increments and S
X∗−i
T has all exponential moments, i.e., E
[
eβS
X∗−i
t
]
< ∞ for all β ∈ R and t ≥ 0, it
follows as in Schied et al. (2010, Theorem 2.1) that for αi > 0
sup
X∈X (xi,T )
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ] = sup
X∈Xdet(xi,T )
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ].
But for αi > 0 and X ∈Xdet(xi, T ) we have
E[uαi(R(X|X−i)) ] =
1
αi
(
1− e−αiE[R(X|X−i) ]+
α2i
2
var (R(X|X−i)
)
,
which shows that CARA utility maximization is equivalent to the maximization of the corresponding
mean-variance functional. The corresponding result for αi = 0 is obvious.
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Proof of Corollary 2.4. Letting Σ(t) :=
∑n
j=1Xj(t) and re-writing (7) yields
ασ2Xi(t) + γX˙i(t)− λX¨i(t) = b(t) + γΣ˙(t) + λΣ¨(t)
and hence (10). Summing over i then implies (9).
Now we prepare for the proof of Theorem 2.5.
Lemma 4.4. For α1 = · · · = αn = α > 0, the matrix M from (32) has four real eigenvalues
θ+, θ−, ρ+, ρ− given by (12). Moreover, with 1 ∈ Rn denoting the vector with all entries equal to 1,
the corresponding eigenspaces are given by
E(ρ±) = span
(
1
ρ±1
)
and E(θ±) =
{(
v
θ±v
) ∣∣∣v ∈ Rn, v ⊥ 1}.
Proof. Let us write an arbitrary vector in R2n as
(
v1
v2
)
for v1,v2 ∈ Rn. By applying M to
(
v1
v2
)
we see
that we must have v2 = τv1 for
(
v1
v2
)
to be an eigenvector with eigenvalue τ . So let us consider vectors
in R2n of the form
(
v
τv
)
for v ∈ Rn and τ ∈ R. The equation M( vτv) = τ( vτv) is equivalent to(ασ2
λ
+
τγ
λ
)
v − ασ
2 + 2τγ
λ(n+ 1)
Jv = τ2v. (33)
When v = 1, then Jv = nv and (33) becomes the quadratic equation
ασ2 + γτ − n(ασ
2 + 2γτ)
n+ 1
− λτ2 = 0,
which is solved for τ = ρ+ and τ = ρ−. When v ⊥ 1, then Jv = 0 and (33) becomes the quadratic
equation
ασ2 + γτ − λτ2 = 0,
which is solved for τ = θ+ and τ = θ−. As the eigenvectors found thus far span the entire space R2n,
the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. It follows from Theorem 2.2 and its proof thatX∗1 , . . . , X∗n are obtained from the
solutions of (31) for f(t) = 0. The general solution of this system is of the form Z(t) = etMZ(0). By
Lemma 4.4, M is diagonalizable and so every solution Z(t) must be a linear combination of exponential
functions eτt, where τ is an eigenvalue of M . Another application of Lemma 4.4 thus implies that each
X∗i can be represented as in (13). One finally checks that for ci(θ+), ci(θ−), c(ρ+), c(ρ−) as in (14) the
boundary conditions X∗i (0) = xi and X
∗
i (T ) = 0 are satisfied. That Σ from (15) solves the two-point
boundary problem (9) can be verified by a straightforward computation.
Proof of Corollary 2.6. From (15) we have that Σ(t) = X∗1 (t) +X∗2 (t) is given by (17). When letting
∆(t) := X∗1 (t)−X∗2 (t), we get from (10) that ∆ solves the two-point boundary value problem
ασ2∆(t) + γ∆˙(t)− λ∆¨(t) = 0, ∆(0) = x1 − x2, ∆(T ) = 0.
This boundary value problem is solved by (18).
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4.2 Proofs for an infinite time horizon
Lemma 4.5. For Xi ∈X (xi,∞) and i = 1, . . . , n, the limit R(Xi|X−i) := − limT↑∞
∫ T
0 X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt
exists, is finite, and is given by
R(Xi|X−i) = xiS0 − γ
2
x2i + σ
∫ ∞
0
Xi(t) dW (t) + γ
∑
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
Xi(t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
n∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
X˙i(t)X˙j(t) dt.
Proof. Integrating by parts yields
−
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)S
X1,...,Xn(t) dt
= (xi −Xi(T ))S0 −X(T )W (T ) + σ
∫ T
0
Xi(t) dW (t)− γ
2
(Xi(T )−Xi(0))2
− γ
∑
j 6=i
Xi(T )(Xj(T )−Xj(0)) + γ
∑
j 6=i
∫ T
0
Xi(t)X˙j(t) dt− λ
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
X˙i(t)X˙j(t) dt.
The assertion now follows by using the law of the iterated logarithm for W , (20), (21), and the
Cauchy–Schwarz inequality.
Now let Xi ∈X (xi,∞), i = 1, . . . , n, be given. As in (23), (24), we get that for Y ∈X (y,∞),
E[R(Y |X−i) ]− αi
2
var (R(Y |X−i)) = c+
∫ ∞
0
L i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt,
where c = yS0 − γ2y2 and the Lagrangian L i is given by (24). Recall that we assume σ2 > 0.
Lemma 4.6. For i = 1, . . . , n and αi > 0, the functional Y 7→
∫∞
0 L
i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt has at
most one maximizer in Xdet(y,∞). If, moreover, X1, . . . , Xn belong to C2[0,∞) and are such that∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣∣γ∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t)
∣∣∣∣ dt <∞, (34)
then there exists a unique maximizer Y ∗ ∈Xdet(y,∞)∩C2[0,∞), which is given as the unique solution
of the boundary value problem
αiσ
2Y (t)− 2λY¨ (t) = γ
∑
j 6=i
X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i
X¨j(t), Y (0) = y, lim
t↑∞
Y (t) = 0. (35)
Moreover, Y satisfies
∫∞
0 |Y˙ (t)|+ |Y¨ (t)| dt <∞.
Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the Lagrangian L i, the convexity of the set Xdet(y,∞),
and the finiteness of the integral
∫∞
0 L
i(t, Y (t), Y˙ (t)|X−i) dt that there can be at most one maximizer
in Xdet(y,∞).
Now, we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumptions X1, . . . , Xn ∈
C2[0,∞) and (34). As noted in the proof of Lemma 4.2, the general solution of the Euler–Lagrange
equation (26) is given by
Y (t) = c1e
−κit + c2eκit − 1
4λκi
∫ t
0
eκi(t−s)u(s) ds+
1
4λκi
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds, (36)
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where u(t) = γ
∑
j 6=i X˙j(t) + λ
∑
j 6=i X¨j(t), c1 and c2 are constants, and κi =
√
αiσ2/2λ > 0. One
checks that (34) implies that
∫ t
0 e
−κi(t−s)u(s) ds→ 0 as t ↑ ∞. Therefore, when letting
c2 :=
1
4λκi
∫ ∞
0
e−κisu(s) ds (37)
and c1 := y − c2, one sees that the corresponding function Y ∗ solves (35).
Next, by (35), (36), and (37), Y ∗(t), Y˙ ∗(t), and Y¨ ∗(t) are linear combinations of the following
functions:
u(t), e−κit,
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)u(s) ds,
∫ ∞
t
eκi(t−s)u(s) ds.
We have ∫ T
0
∫ t
0
e−κi(t−s)|u(s)| ds dt = 1
κi
∫ T
0
|u(s)| ds− 1
κi
∫ T
0
e−κi(T−s)|u(s)| ds
and ∫ T
0
∫ ∞
t
eκi(t−s)|u(s)| ds dt = 1
κi
∫ ∞
0
(eκi(s∧T−s) − 1)|u(s)| ds,
which by (34) both converge to finite limits for T ↑ ∞. It thus follows that ∫∞0 |Y˙ ∗(t)|+|Y¨ ∗(t)| dt <∞.
In the same way, we get
∫∞
0 |Y ∗(t)| dt <∞. Adding the facts that Y ∗ is continuous and tends to zero
as t ↑ ∞, we obtain ∫∞0 (Y ∗(t))2 dt < ∞ and in turn Y ∗ ∈ Xdet(y,∞) ∩ C2[0,∞). The optimality of
Y ∗ follows as in the second part of the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. One first shows just as in Lemma 4.1 that there can be at most one Nash
equilibrium for mean-variance optimization. Moreover, one shows as in the proof of Corollary 2.3
that a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility
maximization.
Now, we turn to the proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium for given initial values x1, . . . , xn ∈ R.
Let M be the 2n × 2n-matrix defined in Remark 4.3. As observed in the proof of Lemma 4.4, any
eigenvector of M with eigenvalue τ must be of the form
(
v
τv
)
for some v ∈ Rn. We will show below
that in both cases, (a) and (b), there exists a basis v1, . . . ,vn of Rn and numbers τ1, . . . , τn < 0 (which
are not necessarily distinct) such that
(
v1
τ1v1
)
, . . . ,
(
vn
τnvn
)
are eigenvectors of M . Taking this fact as
given, let c1, . . . , cn ∈ R be such that c1v1 + · · ·+ cnvn = (x1, . . . , xn)> and define
Z(0) := c1
(
v1
τ1v1
)
+ · · ·+ cn
(
vn
τnvn
)
and Z(t) := etMZ(0).
We denote by X∗(t) the first n components of Z(t). As observed in the proof of Theorem 2.2
and Remark 4.3, X∗(t) will solve the system (27) of coupled Euler–Lagrange equations, which by
Lemma 4.6 is sufficient for optimality in the infinite-horizon setting, provided that the components
correspond to admissible strategies and satisfy the integrability conditions of Lemma 4.6. But each
component of X∗(t) is by construction a linear combination of the decreasing exponential functions
eτ1t, . . . , eτnt, and so these conditions are clearly satisfied.
Now, we consider case (a). Then θ− and ρ− defined in (12) are strictly negative, and so the required
existence of v1, . . . ,vn follows from Lemma 4.4. It follows from the preceding part of the proof that
each component of X∗(t) can be written as
X∗i (t) = ci(θ−)e
θ−t + c(ρ−)eρ−t.
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Letting again Σ(t) :=
∑n
j=1X
∗
j (t) and arguing as in the proof of Theorem 2.5 yields first that Σ(t) =∑n
i=1 xie
ρ−t and then that
c(ρ−) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj and ci(θ−) = xi − c(ρ−).
This establishes (22) and completes the proof of Theorem 3.1 under assumption (a).
Now we turn toward case (b). We may assume without loss of generality that σ = 1. The
characteristic polynomial of the matrix M of the system (31) for n = 2 is
χ(τ) := τ4 − 2γ
3λ
τ3 − γ
2 + 2λ(α1 + α2)
3λ2
τ2 +
α1α2
3λ2
.
Its derivative, χ′, has three distinct roots, t0, t+, t−, which are given by
t0 = 0, t± =
3γ ±√33γ2 + 48 (α1 + α2)λ
12λ
.
Note first that t0 is a strictly positive local maximum of χ because
χ(t0) =
α1α2
3λ2
> 0, χ′′(t0) = −
2
(
2α1λ+ 2α2λ+ γ
2
)
3λ2
< 0.
Next, t+ > 0, t− < 0, and
χ(t−) =
1
864λ5
(
− 96λ3 (α21 − α1α2 + α22)− 168γ2λ2(α1 + α2)− 69γ4λ
+ 16γλ(α1 + α2)
√
48λ3(α1 + α2) + 33γ2λ2 + 11γ
3
√
48λ3(α1 + α2) + 33γ2λ2
)
.
If we can show that χ(t−) < 0 then χ will have precisely two distinct strictly negative roots, due
to the intermediate value theorem. It is, however, not easy to determine by direct inspection of our
preceding formula whether indeed χ(t−) < 0. But, we already know that for α1 = α2 the matrix
M has exactly two strictly negative (though not necessarily distinct) eigenvalues, ρ− and θ−. So in
this case, both eigenvalues must be strictly negative roots of χ. We moreover know that χ(0) > 0,
limτ↓−∞ χ(τ) = +∞, and that t− is the only strictly negative critical point of χ. It follows that we
must have χ(t−) ≤ 0 when α1 = α2. Now suppose that α1 6= α2 and let α := 12(α1 + α2). Then
α1 + α2 = α+ α and
α21 − α1α2 + α22 − α2 =
3
4
(α1 − α2)2 > 0
It therefore follows that χ(t−) < χ(t−), where χ denotes the characteristic polynomial of M when
both α1 and α2 have been substituted by α. As the formula for t− is invariant under this substitution,
we must have χ(t−) ≤ 0 according to what has been said before, and so we arrive at χ(t−) < 0.
It follows from the preceding paragraph that M has two distinct strictly negative eigenvalues τ1
and τ2. Hence, there exist corresponding eigenvectors of the form
(
v1
τ1v1
)
and
(
v2
τ2v2
)
. But, we still need
to exclude the possibility that v1 and v2 are linearly dependent to complete the proof. To this end,
note that it follows from (32) that we must have
1
λ
(
A− 1
n+ 1
JA
)
w + τ
γ
λ
(
I − 2
n+ 1
J
)
w = τ2w (38)
for
(
w
τw
)
to be an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue τ .
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Let us first suppose that the components w1 and w2 of w do not add up to zero: w1 + w2 6= 0.
Then, taking the inner product of the vector equation (38) with the vector
(
1
1
)
yields the equation
α1w1 + α2w2 − τγ(w1 + w2) = 3τ2λ(w1 + w2).
This quadratic equation in τ has the two possible roots
τ± =
−γ ±
√
γ2 + 12λα1w1+α2w2w1+w2
6λ
,
one of which must be equal to τ . As τ− < 0 < τ+ it follows that
(
w
τ˜w
)
cannot be an eigenvector of M
for any τ˜ that is different from τ and has the same sign as τ .
Let us now consider the case in which w1 = −w2. Taking the inner product of the equation (38)
with the vector
(−1
1
)
and using the requirement w1, w2 6= 0 yields the equation α2 +α1 + 2τγ = 2τ2λ,
which is independent of w1 and w2. It has the roots
γ ±√γ2 + 4λ(α1 + α2)
2λ
,
which again have different signs. We thus conclude as in the case w1 + w2 6= 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. It follows from (22) that X∗i (t) has the same sign as
ρ− − θ− = γ
2λ
( −2n
n+ 1
+
√
1 + ξ −
√(n− 1
n+ 1
)2
+
ξ
n+ 1
)
,
where ξ = 4ασ2λ/γ2. The right-hand side is a strictly increasing function of ξ and vanishes for
ξ = 8.
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